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981 
Book Review 
The First Amendment: Saving Us  
From Ourselves 
No Liberty for License: The Forgotten Logic  
of the First Amendment 
 by David Lowenthal 
Spence Publishing Company (1997) 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The First Amendment is not difficult to interpret.”2 How-
ever, its interpretation has “taken some wrong and dangerous 
turns—not by malice, but by superficial thinking.”3 So con-
cludes Dr. David Lowenthal4 in No Liberty for License: The 
Forgotten Logic of the First Amendment. The book is a criticism 
of the Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of the First 
Amendment; “the Court made individual freedom its god—at 
the expense of the moral, social, and political needs of ordered 
society.”5 
The attack on current First Amendment jurisprudence fo-
cuses on (1) its inadequacy in dealing with revolutionary 
groups, e.g., the Ku Klux Klan or the Black Panthers; (2) its 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. DAVID LOWENTHAL, NO LIBERTY FOR LICENSE: THE FORGOTTEN LOGIC OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 272 (1997). 
 3. Id. at 271. 
 4. Dr. Lowenthal is a teacher of Political Science at Boston College. He received 
undergraduate degrees from both Brooklyn College and New York University. He went 
on to receive a Ph.D from the New School for Social Research. 
 5. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at xiv. 
TAL-FIN.DOC 4/10/00 1:19 PM 
982 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
indulgence in obscenity; and (3) its establishment of a “wall of 
separation” between church and state.6 More specifically, the 
bulk of this assault is centered on the legacy of Justice 
Holmes,7 a legacy that, according to Dr. Lowenthal, impermis-
sibly broadened First Amendment interpretation to protect 
revolutionary groups and obscenity. Beyond this, Dr. Lowen-
thal contends that the “wall of separation” between church and 
state runs counter to the original intent of the framers.8 Each 
prong of Dr. Lowenthal’s arguments reaches the same conclu-
sion: the Supreme Court has led the country toward a slippery 
slope of license and anarchy in its interpretation of the First 
Amendment. 
The book claims as its foundation the original intention and 
meaning of the First Amendment,9 raising two questions: First, 
has Dr. Lowenthal indeed discovered the true intent of the 
framers? Second, are we bound by that original intention? As to 
the former question, Dr. Lowenthal’s interpretations are ques-
tionable; they go even farther than other originalist arguments; 
they are often based not on the words of the framers, but on the 
philosophies of the day. The second question is equally trou-
bling. “Originalism” is a much criticized and hotly debated the-
ory of constitutional law. Yet, while recognizing this conten-
tion, Dr. Lowenthal gives the issue only shallow analysis. 
Dr. Lowenthal argues that the Supreme Court erred in in-
corporating the First Amendment into the Fourteenth, assert-
ing incorporation is both illogical and internally inconsistent 
with the language of the First Amendment. While this may 
very well be true, Dr. Lowenthal fails to adequately address the 
Supreme Court’s actual rationale in incorporating the princi-
ples of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth. 
The author concludes that the Supreme Court has compro-
mised the original social compact of this nation in order to 
 
 6. See id. at xvii-xxi. 
 7. Indeed, this otherwise intelligent book is often undermined by Dr. Lowen-
thal’s ad hominem attacks on Justice Holmes. For example, Justice Holmes is de-
nounced as being a confused voice for a “witch’s brew of philosophical notions” that he 
had to borrow, “not being [a] great thinker [himself].” Id. at 53. Such attacks only serve 
to undermine the book’s reasoning. 
 8. Throughout the book, Dr. Lowenthal “reserve[s] the term ‘founders’ for those 
who helped write the Constitution and ‘framers’ for those who helped write the First 
Amendment.” Id. at xxiii. For the sake of consistency, that pattern will be followed 
throughout this Book Review. 
 9. See id. at xiii. 
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champion the individual freedoms noted in the Constitution. 
The Court has forgotten the obligations imposed by the social 
compact. Without these obligations, there is no counterbalance 
to personal liberty. Complete liberty, without limitation, de-
generates into license. 
II.  REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS, OBSCENITY, RELIGION AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
The book is actually a composition of three distinct aspects 
of First Amendment jurisprudence. Dr. Lowenthal discusses 
the status of revolutionary groups, obscenity, and separation of 
church and state under the First Amendment. Each of these 
sections is tied to the others by the notion that the First 
Amendment’s interpretation has been tainted by a shift in phi-
losophy; the founders and framers generally relied on the phi-
losophy of Locke, with its accompanying social compact, while 
the Supreme Court has focused on individual rights champi-
oned by Mill and even Darwin.10 
A. Revolutionary Groups 
The democracies in both the Wiemar Republic and Czecho-
slovakia collapsed due to legalized revolutionary parties. Ac-
 
 10. For example, in discussing revolutionary groups, Dr. Lowenthal notes that 
the philosophical basis for the position taken by Justices Holmes and Brandeis is the 
works of Mill and Darwin. From Mill, the notion of supreme individual liberty is taken, 
from Darwin, the idea that truth is “determined not by intrinsic merit but by the mar-
ketplace.” LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 44. These philosophies conflict, when applied 
to revolutionary groups, with Locke’s ideas of the rights of man being bound up in a 
social compact: 
Locke’s philosophy of the rights of man was sweeping the world toward lib-
eral representative democracy. Soon, Mill feared, the enemies of liberty 
would be not kings, nobles, or priests but the people themselves, oppressing 
minorities in both social and political life. The rule of the people seemed in-
exorably on its way to a secure dominion, but what effect would it have on in-
dividual liberty? 
Id. at 45-46. In response to this perceived threat, Mill championed individual liberty. 
He went as far as stating that the actual instigation of tyrannicide may be punished, 
but a connection must be shown between the killing and the instigation. Thus, no ac-
tion can be taken against the instigator until a crime has actually occurred as a result 
of the instigation. 
This is clearly impossible in the case of revolutionary groups. The crime that is 
being committed, i.e., the overthrow of the government, itself insures that it will not be 
punished. Is it even plausible to say that a successful revolutionary group would re-
verse course and punish the instigators of the rebellion? However, this is the very re-
sult reached in following Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test. 
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cording to Dr. Lowenthal, America is closer than many realize 
to a similar situation, due to the Supreme Court’s misguided 
interpretations of the First Amendment.11 The underlying prob-
lem is a (seemingly) ever-expanding umbrella of protected 
speech and press. 
Dr. Lowenthal continues by arguing that the First Amend-
ment was never meant to secure every right of speech, writing, 
or other communication; the very presumption “is a supposition 
too wild to be indulged by any rational man.”12 The Court’s 
original test for First Amendment protection was the “clear 
danger” test that left unprotected speech and press which could 
be dangerous to the Republic.13 
Emphasizing personal liberty, however, the Court re-
vamped the “clear danger” test, adopting, in its place, the “clear 
and present danger” test.14 Justice Holmes first coined this 
phrase, in the First Amendment context, in his majority opin-
ion in Schenck v. United States.15 Holmes’s position is this: ab-
sent a clear and present danger “of serious injury to the 
state,”16 the speech is protected by the First Amendment. Even 
speech which, if accepted, would lead to the downfall of the na-
tion is acceptable if there is no present danger of violating the 
law.17 Eventually, Justice Holmes’s position was accepted as 
the Warren Court “shifted sharply in favor of individual lib-
 
 11. The goal of the First Amendment was to secure “above all . . . republican gov-
ernment at the national level . . . . [T]he First Amendment cannot possibly have been 
intended to protect political movements dedicated to the overthrow of republican gov-
ernment . . . .” LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 20. It was clear, through the early twenti-
eth century, that both state and federal governments were free to make urging a party 
to defy the law a crime in itself. In 1917, Judge Learned Hand said, “Words . . . which 
have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude of interpreta-
tion be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of government in a democ-
ratic state.” Id. (quoting Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)). That is 
to say, such language does not fall under the protective shield of the First Amendment. 
 12. Id. at 29 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 
1880 (5th ed. 1833)). 
 13. See id. at 26. 
 14. See id. 
 15. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1925). 
 16. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Dr. 
Lowenthal considers this phrase disgraceful. “Even likely injury to individuals does not 
qualify as sufficiently serious. Counseling the murder of an individual . . . is protected 
by the First Amendment. Inciting a murder with a likelihood of its occurring is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.” LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 37. The reason is that 
these individual injuries are not “serious injury to the state.” Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 17. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 35. 
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erty.”18 
B. Obscenity 
The shift to individual liberty has continued in the Court’s 
more recent obscenity decisions. Although laws against obscen-
ity were long upheld in America, Dr. Lowenthal points to their 
decline during the period of the sexual revolution. 
In 1973, the Court clarified the test for obscenity in Paris 
Adult Theatres v. Slaton.19 A work that was prurient or pat-
ently offensive had to have “serious” social value to muster a 
First Amendment challenge against regulation.20 Although this 
clarity was needed, the Court’s test of patent offensiveness 
was, according to Dr. Lowenthal, regrettably coupled with a 
narrower field of application, limiting obscenity to pornogra-
phy.21 Additionally, in Miller v. California,22 the Court further 
narrowed the definition of obscenity to “hard-core pornogra-
phy.” The most dangerous result of this decision was that “the 
production of obscenity of every description short of the Court’s 
narrow ban ha[s] become a flourishing industry.”23 
In short, all forms of obscenity that fall outside of this nar-
row definition promulgated by the Supreme Court are thriving 
in America and undermining the American family. “A thirty-
year-long judicial effort to expand liberty in the name of intel-
lectual, literary, and artistic progress has resulted not in 
greater thought, literature, and art but in their obvious degra-
dation and vulgarization.”24 
C. The “Wall of Separation” Between Church and State 
Finally, the book deals with the Court’s “wall of separation” 
between church and state. Relying on original intent, Dr. 
Lowenthal argues this wall should never have been built. This 
is a difficult originalist argument to make in light of contradic-
tory statements made by several of the framers themselves. 
Three distinct elements of the modern Court’s view of the 
 
 18. Id. at 5. 
 19. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 20. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 136-37. 
 21. See id. 
 22. 413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973). 
 23. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 147. 
 24. Id.  
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religious portion of the First Amendment are challenged: the 
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the defi-
nition of religion. The Court has incorporated the First 
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby forbid-
ding any state establishment of religion or inhibition of the free 
exercise of religion.25 Dr. Lowenthal considers this proposition 
inconsistent with the language of the First Amendment and, 
therefore, rejects it. Further, there currently exists a nearly 
complete blanket of separation between church and either fed-
eral or state government. Finally, the Court has broadly de-
fined “religion,” including even “a . . . belief that is sincere and 
meaningful [which] occupies a place in the life of its possessor 
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”26 This in-
terpretation is wholly inconsistent with the intent of the fram-
ers of the First Amendment. 
Dr. Lowenthal argues original intent did not establish a 
firm “wall of separation” between church and state. Indeed, 
non-preferential aid can, consistently with original intent, be 
given to all religions. Additionally, neither the Establishment 
Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause is offended by the gov-
ernment’s favoring religion over “irreligion.”27 However, the 
modern Court has placed “irreligion” under the First Amend-
ment’s umbrella. This must be remedied; “religion” must be de-
fined restrictively, as being “anchored in beings or realities 
that are permanent, transcending ordinary experience.”28 
Next, the Supreme Court erroneously incorporated the 
First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. Dr. Lowen-
thal believes the language “Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion”29 implies that the states 
were free to establish religion. The framers anticipated that 
states would indeed establish religions, “respecting” which, 
Congress could pass no laws. Further, with respect to the Free 
Exercise Clause, religions should be prohibited from breaking 
the law. For example, Congress was within its authority to for-
bid polygamous marriages although it impinged on the free ex-
ercise of religion. However, the Court has wavered on this is-
sue, allowing, for instance, Jehovah’s Witnesses to refrain from 
 
 25. See id. at 222-44. 
 26. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965). 
 27. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 226. 
 28. Id. at 256. 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
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saluting the flag where required in a school setting. 
Once again, Dr. Lowenthal argues that Mill, the champion 
of individual liberty, is the Court’s source for the transition 
from the framers’ original intent. Only the banner of individual 
liberty allows religions to violate laws and regulations. Only 
under the banner of personal freedom can one so broadly define 
“religion” as to encompass even those who do not believe in any 
power higher than humankind. 
III.  ORIGINALISM AND ORIGINAL INTENT 
A.  Originalism—Are We Bound? 
The first step in following Dr. Lowenthal’s argument is to 
accept the notion that the original intent of the framers gov-
erns. Does it? Dr. Lowenthal’s reasoning is this: the framers 
were steeped in the substantive and interpretive doctrine of 
Blackstone and the philosophy of Locke. In interpreting stat-
utes, Blackstone followed the doctrine of original intent. In cre-
ating the First Amendment, the framers incorporated mean-
ings consistent with both Locke and Blackstone. Just as with 
any statute, the Constitution should be interpreted with the in-
tent of the framers in mind. Thus, we are limited to the phi-
losophers of the day, mainly Locke, and the writings of the 
framers to interpret the Constitution. 
Interestingly, Dr. Lowenthal does not mention at any point 
that any of the framers stated that they actually had the inter-
pretive mode of Blackstone in mind when they enacted the 
First Amendment. Rather, he states that they must have had it 
in mind. Perhaps they did, but why is there no first-hand sup-
port cited for that conclusion? 
Such an argument lends credence to the words of Justice 
Brennan: 
[Originalism] is a view that feigns self-effacing deference to 
the specific judgments of those who forged our original social 
compact. But in truth it is little more than arrogance cloaked 
as humility. It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage 
we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on applica-
tion of principle to specific, contemporary questions.30 
 
 30. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 23, 25 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990). 
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B. What was the Original Intent? 
Assuming an examination of original intent is the correct 
way to interpret the First Amendment, is Dr. Lowenthal’s in-
terpretation of that intent correct? Recall the conclusions of an-
other originalist, Robert Bork, about the First Amendment: 
We know very little of the precise intentions of the framers and 
ratifiers of the speech and press clauses of the first amend-
ment. But we do know that they gave into the judges’ keeping 
the value of preserving free expression and, in particular, the 
preservation of political expression, which is commonly con-
ceded to be the value at the core of these clauses.31 
This statement reaches a conclusion that is difficult to reconcile 
with Dr. Lowenthal’s own findings. Although Dr. Lowenthal’s 
analysis may be correct, his conclusions are precipitously bal-
anced upon the proof he offers; a stiff critical breeze could top-
ple them. 
Dr. Lowenthal’s rationale for his position on revolutionary 
groups is illustrative of this point. As previously noted, his po-
sition is that the First Amendment does not protect the state-
ments of revolutionary groups, as acceptance of these state-
ments would result in the downfall of the very government 
assigned to uphold the liberties of the First Amendment.32 
What is the historical basis of this principle? 
One would think that the first place to turn would be the 
words of the framers themselves. What evidence could be 
stronger than the express statement of the framers, “Our in-
tent is X”? Instead, Dr. Lowenthal supports his position by re-
lying on Sir William Blackstone and his Commentaries on the 
Laws of England,33 giving only passing notice to the framers’ 
words—words that undermine the very Blackstonian view he 
favors. 
Blackstone noted that the government is free to “punish . . . 
any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, 
shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious 
tendency,” as it “is necessary for the preservation of peace and 
good order, of government . . . .”34 This view, Dr. Lowenthal ar-
 
 31. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 168 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 32. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
 33. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 10. 
 34. IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 152-53 
(21st ed., London 1847).  
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gues, was adopted by the First Amendment.35 The federal gov-
ernment, regardless of the language of the First Amendment, is 
allowed to prohibit seditious libel. 
The framers further relied on the philosophy of Locke with 
its social compact. This limited personal freedom where it con-
tradicted the objectives of society. Even accepting the conten-
tion that the framers were steeped in Locke, should we give 
this philosopher’s thoughts more credence in constitutional in-
terpretation than the writings of the framers themselves? In-
deed, when we look beyond Locke’s philosophy and into the 
statements of the framers themselves, the notion that the fed-
eral government could limit even revolutionary speech quickly 
becomes unstable. 
Dr. Lowenthal cites two notable authorities that seem to 
contradict his Blackstone/Locke argument of original intent— 
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. “Both [of these framers] 
claimed that the First Amendment from the outset had utterly 
deprived the national government of control over speech and 
press. . . .”36 Further, this position was adopted by the majority 
of the legislature in reaction to the Alien and Sedition Acts in 
1798, a mere seven years after the ratification of the First 
Amendment.37 
Madison and Jefferson both vehemently opposed the Alien 
and Sedition Acts of 1798.38 Their Virginia and Kentucky Reso-
lutions were passed in reaction to these laws. Dr. Lowenthal 
responds by pointing out that other framers, most notably 
soon-to-be Chief Justice John Marshall, opposed the Virginia 
and Kentucky resolutions. However, theirs was the minority 
view. Madison and Jefferson both felt that the First Amend-
ment forbade the federal government from controlling freedom 
of speech.39 Although Jefferson felt that states had the author-
ity to control freedom of speech, he too believed that the federal 
government was completely barred by the First Amendment. In 
light of the success of Madison’s and Jefferson’s resolutions, 
 
 35. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 10; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494, 534 (1897) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that the Bill of Rights had 
incorporated the liberties of English law with “no intention of disregarding the excep-
tions”). 
 36. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 14. 
 37. See id. at 14-15. 
 38. See id. at 15. 
 39. See id. at 17. 
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this view seems to have been the majority view. 
Madison’s insistence that the First Amendment, as 
adopted, forbade federal interference is clear from his opposi-
tion to the Alien and Sedition Acts. Additionally, Madison’s 
own proposal for the First Amendment forbade both state and 
federal governments from depriving or abridging the people’s 
“right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the 
freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, 
shall be inviolable.”40 Jefferson was in agreement with Madison 
that the First Amendment forbade interference by the federal 
government.41 
Dr. Lowenthal criticizes Madison’s view as follows: “Madi-
son’s reasoning . . . falls short of showing that the words ‘free-
dom of speech and press’ in the First Amendment were ex-
pected to have any other meaning than the Blackstonian 
meaning they demonstrably had in state constitutions.”42 How-
ever, this misses the point; did the framers of the First 
Amendment of the federal Constitution intend for it to have the 
Blackstonian meaning? Relying on Madison and Jefferson, the 
answer is no. The only evidence Dr. Lowenthal provides to 
counter this conclusion is the minority federalist view that was 
rejected in the legislature’s reaction (spearheaded by Madison 
and Jefferson) to the Alien and Sedition Acts.43 
In summary, Dr. Lowenthal’s interpretation of original in-
tent is, at least, questionable. He rejects the philosophy of two 
of the founding fathers of our nation in order to reach his goal. 
What is more troubling, his support is found in what is, admit-
tedly, the minority view of the federalists. Yet, support through 
Blackstone is consistent with English law at the time. When 
interpreting the Constitution, who is the more reliable source 
 
 40. Id. at 14. 
 41. In a letter to Abigail Adams, Thomas Jefferson discussed the effect of the 
First Amendment on slander. He said, “[W]e deny that Congress have a right to control 
the freedom of the press.” Id. at 17. Though he went on to say that the states could 
regulate these rights (bear in mind the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet been 
passed, much less deemed to have incorporated the principles found in the First 
Amendment) his prohibition of Congressional interference was absolute. 
 42. Id. at 16. 
 43. John Marshall (future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) authored the Mi-
nority Report in opposition to Madison’s Virginia resolution (rejecting the Alien and 
Sedition Acts as unconstitutional). Id. at 15. Although the report is well-reasoned in its 
explanation of why Blackstonian philosophy should be accepted in interpreting the 
First Amendment, the fact that it is the minority view only seven years after the adop-
tion of the First Amendment speaks volumes about the framers’ actual intent. 
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of original intent, Jefferson and Madison, on the one hand, or 
Blackstone on the other? Indeed, given the federalists’ accep-
tance of the Blackstonian view, can the judiciary be faulted, on 
originalist grounds, for following the views of Madison and Jef-
ferson, views supported by Congress a mere seven years after 
the passage of the First Amendment? 
Dr. Lowenthal couches his argument against revolutionary 
groups in the language of seditious libel. Again, however, 
Bork’s conclusion concerning libel is illuminative. “Perhaps the 
framers did not envision libel actions as a major threat to . . . 
freedom [of, especially, political expression].”44 It is quite possi-
ble that the framers never even considered the issue. It be-
comes impossible to find original intent where none exists. 
IV.  INCORPORATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTO THE 
FOURTEENTH 
According to Dr. Lowenthal, the First Amendment was in-
corporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in three separate 
cases. The 1925 case of Gitlow v. New York45 incorporated the 
Freedom of Speech and Press Clauses into the Fourteenth 
Amendment; in 1940, the case of Cantwell v. Connecticut46 in-
corporated the Free Exercise Clause; and in 1947, Everson v. 
Board of Education47 incorporated the Establishment Clause. 
Dr. Lowenthal argues that the holdings in these cases were er-
roneous. 
The heart of his argument is that it is not plausible to in-
corporate the language of the First Amendment because the 
Amendment specifically reserves that power to the states. This 
argument is based on Dr. Lowenthal’s interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause. That clause will be the focus of this sec-
tion. 
A. The Reservation of States’ Rights 
The Establishment Clause reads, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion.”48 Dr. Lowenthal 
argues that this is “both a guarantee of no Federal religious es-
 
 44. Id. at 16. 
 45. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 46. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 47. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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tablishment and a recognition of the power of the states to es-
tablish religions.”49 Just as the Tenth Amendment cannot be 
incorporated because it is an express reservation of states’ 
power, so the First Amendment cannot be incorporated because 
it is an implied reservation of states’ power. This view does 
have historical support. Massachusetts, for example, had a 
state-established religion early in its history. However, Dr. 
Lowenthal points out that by 1940, every state constitution 
contained a clause similar to the Establishment Clause. Thus, 
even if this power was reserved to the states, the point has 
been effectively mooted for the present by the states’ desire to 
avoid establishments of religions. Even if Dr. Lowenthal were 
correct that the Establishment Clause should not have been in-
corporated, a change in that rule of law would have no impact 
on the country. 
B.  Incorporating Language or Principles? 
Dr. Lowenthal argues that the plain language of the First 
Amendment bars its incorporation into the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, only Justice Black favored such literal 
incorporation of the First Amendment; when the Supreme 
Court incorporated the First Amendment, it did so not because 
it was in the Bill of Rights, but because the principle it rests on 
is a fundamental right. Dr. Lowenthal is arguing against a 
straw-man made up from concurring opinions of Justice Black, 
which were never adopted by the Court. 
The principle behind the Establishment Clause was to dis-
allow a government-sustained religion. In the Bill of Rights, 
this principle was enunciated with respect to Congress only. On 
its own, each state has more or less echoed the language of the 
Establishment Clause in its own Constitution. Again, this fur-
thers the basic principle of separation. It is this principle, 
which supports the plain language of the First Amendment, 
that was incorporated by the Court. 
The language of Duncan v. Louisiana,50 a Supreme Court 
decision regarding the incorporation of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, is illustrative. The Court looked at whether the 
rights guaranteed in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are 
“fundamental rights.” The question is “whether [the] right is 
 
 49. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 232. 
 50. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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among those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions.’ ”51 In light of the fact that governmental establishment 
of religion is barred not only by the Federal Constitution but 
also every state constitution, it is plausible to state that the 
principle of non-establishment is a “fundamental right.” 
Indeed, the Court in Everson spoke of the First Amendment 
as being the expression of the framers’ “feeling of abhorrence” 
towards established religions.52 In determining that the Estab-
lishment Clause was incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court focused on “the light of [the First 
Amendment’s] history and the evils it was designed forever to 
suppress.”53 For these reasons, namely the principles behind it, 
the First Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
However, while this may well defeat Dr. Lowenthal’s argu-
ment, it does not necessarily defeat his position. How can the 
right not to have state-established religions “lie at the base of 
all our civil and political institutions” when Massachusetts and 
other states actually had state-established religions? 
Thus, although Dr. Lowenthal’s own reasoning is incapable 
of supporting his conclusion, there is at least one viable argu-
ment that his general position against incorporation is correct. 
By itself, however, Dr. Lowenthal’s argument fails to address 
the actual basis around which the Supreme Court’s rationale of 
incorporation turned. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If nothing else, Dr. Lowenthal promulgates a necessary 
warning. The “clear and present danger” test is inadequate to 
deal with (especially successful) revolutionary groups and with 
obscenity, which has had an overwhelmingly negative effect on 
our society. Indeed, as for the role of religion in America, Jef-
ferson himself pondered, 
Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have 
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the 
people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are 
not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I tremble for my 
 
   51. Id. at 148 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). 
 52. 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). 
 53. Id. at 14-15. 
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country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot 
forever sleep.54 
Beyond this, however, unanswered questions undermine 
this well-reasoned book. How can a firm understanding of 
original intent be founded solely on the theories of Blackstone 
and Locke? How can we dismiss comments of the framers in di-
rect contradiction to Dr. Lowenthal’s conclusions? It is difficult 
to accept his solutions, especially where they are based on at-
tenuated arguments of original intent. Thus, although the 
country may be headed to hell in a hand-basket, it is a stretch 
to argue that salvation lies in the original framework of the 
First Amendment. 
Cory A. Talbot 
 
 54. LOWENTHAL, supra note 2, at 190 (quoting The Complete Jefferson at 677 
(1802) (Query XVIII of the Notes on Virginia, 1782)). 
